Cases52 cases

20 to 24 of 52

1. IL-0131 A new kind of GenerateContent request made Vertex AI prediction API servers segfault, and once enough of them restarted at the same time the serving fleet could not carry the load

   Google Cloud2024

   Symptoms

   From 12:06 US/Pacific on 12 June 2024, services built on Vertex AI Prediction began reporting failed user requests in eight regions: us-central1, asia-southeast1, europe-west3, europe-west4, us-east1, us-west1, northamerica-northeast1 and us-east4.

   High error rateHigh latencyIntermittent timeouts

   Trigger

   Starting on 8 June 2024, a new form of user request to the GenerateContent API caused intermittent segmentation faults in the Vertex Serving Prediction API servers; on 12 June the rate of such requests increased.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Model inference serverCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Partial rolloutNo headroom

   Detection

   Internal production monitoring alerted engineers to the segfaults on 10 June 2024 at 07:35 US/Pacific, before any visible customer impact; on 12 June services built on Vertex Prediction reported failing user requests.

   Remediation

   • confirmed the new failures came from the same segfault found on 10 June
   • accelerated the rollout of the fix that was already in progress, completed at 15:59 US/Pacific

   Action items

   • Ensure early signals of server binary issues are captured in production health analysis and investigated in time
   • Ensure release validation of feature changes and updates in production

   Lessons

   A crash that only some requests trigger can stay invisible while load balancers route around the restarting servers. It becomes an outage when the share of such requests grows until too many servers are restarting at once. Here the cause was known and a fix was rolling out two days before customers were affected, but the progressive rollout had not finished when the triggering traffic increased; Google's follow-up is to investigate early signals of server binary issues in time.

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2. IL-0123 A response buffer allocated anew in a loop made OpenAI's routing layer nodes hit their memory limits and fail readiness checks on a morning with more completions than any day before, causing 502 and 503 errors across all models

   OpenAI2023

   Symptoms

   Between 5:42 AM and 7:16 AM PT on 8 November 2023 a large share of requests to OpenAI failed with 502 or 503 errors. Every model and API endpoint saw significant failures.

   High error rateService outageProbe failures

   Trigger

   A morning with dramatically more completions than any previous day pushed the routing layer nodes, which already had a chronic memory problem, past their memory limits.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Model request routingContainer memory limit

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitNo headroom

   Remediation

   • limited incoming traffic
   • redeployed the routing service en masse
   • ramped traffic back up slowly

   Action items

   • Pre-allocate the responseBuffer and reuse it instead of allocating a new one in a loop (3X improvement in memory and CPU usage)
   • Adjust the configured memory limits to an appropriate level so the service has significant headroom
   • Add rate limit controls to shed traffic more gracefully
   • Increase the service's capacity
   • Change alerting to catch the underlying memory behaviour before it escalates into service issues
   • Configure autoscaling for the service, which was not possible before because added capacity could hurt an upstream service

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3. IL-0202 A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recover

   Honeycomb2023sev1

   Symptoms

   Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

   High error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopService outageDatabase overload

   Trigger

   An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Application databaseIn-memory cache

   Contributing factor

   Retry stormAutomation amplification

   Detection

   Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

   Remediation

   • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
   • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
   • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided

   Action items

   • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
   • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths

   Lessons

   Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

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4. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast

   Microsoft Azure2023

   Symptoms

   From about 10:30 UTC on 30 August 2023, customers had trouble accessing or using Azure, Microsoft 365 and Power Platform services in Australia East. The affected Azure services included Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) along with storage, SQL Database, Cosmos DB, virtual machines and Azure Resource Manager.

   Control plane unresponsiveHigh error rateService outage

   Trigger

   At 08:41 UTC a lightning strike on electrical infrastructure about 18 miles away caused a utility voltage sag that shut down the cooling chillers of datacenters in one Australia East availability zone; 13 chillers failed to restart automatically and five could not be restarted, so two data halls overheated and their infrastructure was shut down.

   Root cause

   Cloud provider outage

   Component

   AKS control planeApplication database

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureExcessive blast radius

   Detection

   Cosmos DB impact was detected by monitoring at 10:47 UTC, first automated communications went to Azure Service Health at 10:48 UTC, the public Azure Status page was updated at 11:30 UTC, and all subscriptions in Australia East were sent portal communications at 11:36 UTC.

   Remediation

   • shut down the remaining networking, compute and storage in the two affected data halls so the chilled water loop could cool down
   • restarted the five chillers manually at 12:12 UTC
   • restored power to all hardware by 15:10 UTC and brought infrastructure back in phases
   • restored AKS operations through the recovery of the SQL Database operation queue, with no other mitigation

   Action items

   • AKS: convert all operation queue SQL Database databases to be zone redundant (estimated September 2023)
   • AKS: replace all cross-region SQL Database queue usage with zone-redundant Service Bus queues (estimated September 2023)
   • Change the control timing logic of the Chiller Management System so chillers do not fail to restart after voltage fluctuations
   • Change the emergency procedure for manual restarts of simultaneous chiller failures from an adjacent sequence to a load-based sequence per data hall
   • Increase technician staffing at the datacenter as a temporary measure for manual chiller restarts
   • Storage: optimise the large-scale recovery process and update troubleshooting guides (estimated December 2023)
   • Azure Service Fabric: improve reliability of SQL Database tenant ring recovery (estimated December 2023)
   • SQL Database: review the trigger criteria of auto-failover groups (estimated October 2023)
   • SQL Database: upgrade internal tooling to enable mass migration of databases (estimated December 2023)
   • Cosmos DB: optimise Service Managed Failover for single-region-write accounts (estimated November 2023)
   • ARM: complete the migration of its storage layer to the zonally redundant architecture (estimated December 2023)
   • Incident management: harden readiness, process and playbook for power-down scenarios (estimated October 2023)

   Lessons

   A control plane spread across availability zones still fails with a zone when one of its dependencies, here the SQL Database operation queue, is not zone redundant. When a second region uses the same database, the failure crosses into that region as well. Workloads already running were not expected to be affected; what stopped was everything that needs the managed service's control plane, such as scaling and cluster changes.

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5. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS

   Adevinta2023

   Symptoms

   On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresHigh latency

   Root cause

   DNS or network fault

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheTelemetry agent

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsUnknown limitIgnored early signalUnverified assumption

   Detection

   A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

   Remediation

   • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
   • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
   • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
   • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
   • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls

   Lessons

   The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

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