Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases29 cases

9 to 13 of 29

  1. Symptoms

    Every service in the homelab Kubernetes cluster stopped answering: the V-Rising server, Grafana, Jellyfin and Linkding were all unreachable, and the Kubernetes API was down, so the cluster could not be managed at all. The outage was found by hand, about 3 hours after it began, when someone tried to use the services.

    Trigger

    A power outage forced the Kubernetes master node to reboot.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Manually, when someone tried to access the services; there were no automated alerts.

    Remediation
    • Connected a monitor to the master node and read the boot logs, which showed the kernel panic
    • Booted the previous kernel version, which brought the system back
    • Removed the broken Nvidia packages with sudo apt-get remove --purge '^nvidia-.*' and ran sudo dpkg --configure -a
    • Found remaining broken packages with dpkg -l | grep -v ^ii and removed them by hand
    • Ran sudo apt-get install -f and reinstalled linux-headers-$(uname -r)
    • Rebooted and confirmed the kernel panic was gone
    Action items
    • Make sure GPU driver installations fully succeed, or revert immediately when they fail
    • Move the cluster to a high-availability control plane
    • Expose the Kubernetes API through a load balancer in the HA setup
    • Set up a ticketing system to record incidents and their resolution
    • Write predefined troubleshooting workflows to shorten response time
    • Add infrastructure monitoring such as Prometheus and Grafana
    • Add blackbox HTTP and TCP checks from outside the cluster for critical services
    Lessons

    A driver installation that fails half-way can leave kernel packages broken without any visible effect until the next reboot, which may come weeks later and at the worst time. A failed DKMS build should be fixed or reverted at once. With a single master node and no monitoring from outside the cluster, one unbootable machine meant a total outage that nobody was told about; the fix itself was simple once the boot logs were seen.

  2. Symptoms

    Over a 54-day snapshot of Llama 3 405B pre-training the training job was interrupted 466 times. 47 interruptions were planned: automated maintenance such as firmware upgrades, or operator actions such as configuration or dataset updates. The other 419 were unexpected. Because training is synchronous, a failure on a single GPU can force a restart of the whole job.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The communication library's state is monitored and a stalled collective is timed out automatically; on an NCCLX watchdog or heartbeat timeout the PyTorch NCCL flight recorder dumps its tracing data, including collective metadata and stack traces.

    Remediation
    • handled almost every interruption through automation, with significant manual intervention only three times in 54 days
    Action items
    • Reduce job startup and checkpointing time
    • Use the PyTorch NCCL flight recorder to record every communication event and collective duration and to dump traces on NCCLX watchdog or heartbeat timeouts
    • Turn on heavier tracing and metadata collection in production through online configuration changes, without a code release or job restart
    • Give PyTorch access to NCCLX internal state so stalls are detected and localised faster, with a snapshot of the failing collective's finished and pending transfers
    Lessons

    Training on 16K GPUs has more failure modes than Meta's much larger CPU clusters, and because training is synchronous a single GPU failure can force a restart of the whole job. Meta raised effective training time by cutting job startup and checkpoint time and by building tools for fast diagnosis, and kept it above 90% while automated firmware and kernel maintenance caused at least one interruption a day.

  3. Symptoms

    At 23:48 CET on 24 January 2024 the Scaleway Kubernetes API for the FR-PAR region ran out of memory. At the same minute Scaleway saw requests to its API Gateway spike.

    Trigger

    Simultaneous deployments in the FR-PAR region pushed the Scaleway Kubernetes API out of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Increased load on the API Gateway was detected at 23:48, the minute the incident began, and the incident was escalated to on-call engineers at 00:00:10.

    Remediation
    • raised the memory limit and garbage collection thresholds of the Kubernetes managed services
    • deployed additional replicas of key services
    • purged the registry cache and monitored the clusters as they stabilised
    • adjusted service configurations after the incident to keep the platform stable
    Action items
    • Implement a local authentication cache
    • Further develop node authentication
    • Enhance monitoring, adjust rate limiting strategies and improve incident response protocols
    Lessons

    Because the Kubernetes API also handled node authentication, its memory exhaustion made some nodes NotReady, and the endless retries of those nodes added load on the API Gateway. Scaleway plans a local authentication cache and further work on node authentication.

  4. Symptoms

    At 20:31 UTC on 15 November 2023, some GPU virtual machines in us-northcentral1-a became unavailable. One row of servers in a Crusoe Cloud data center in the us-northcentral1 region had lost power, and every server in the row powered off together with the VMs running on it.

    Trigger

    While the row's UPS was in bypass mode for routine maintenance, power switched from the primary source to a backup source for reasons unrelated to the maintenance.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The power failure happened at 20:31 UTC. The first status post, at 21:07 UTC, said certain VMs in us-northcentral1-a were unavailable, and at 21:31 UTC the status page said the affected VMs had been identified.

    Remediation
    • identified the VMs on the row that lost power
    • restarted the affected VMs after power was restored
    Action items
    • Review the standard operating procedures for UPS maintenance to minimise customer impact during future maintenance
    • Build future data centers with redundant UPSs
    • Improve recovery procedures to reduce mean time to resolution
    Lessons

    When the only UPS for a row is in bypass for maintenance, the row is exposed to any power event during that window, even one unrelated to the work. Crusoe Cloud's response is redundant UPSs in future data centers, a review of maintenance procedures, and faster recovery of VMs after power returns.

  5. Symptoms

    From about 10:30 UTC on 30 August 2023, customers had trouble accessing or using Azure, Microsoft 365 and Power Platform services in Australia East. The affected Azure services included Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) along with storage, SQL Database, Cosmos DB, virtual machines and Azure Resource Manager.

    Trigger

    At 08:41 UTC a lightning strike on electrical infrastructure about 18 miles away caused a utility voltage sag that shut down the cooling chillers of datacenters in one Australia East availability zone; 13 chillers failed to restart automatically and five could not be restarted, so two data halls overheated and their infrastructure was shut down.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Cosmos DB impact was detected by monitoring at 10:47 UTC, first automated communications went to Azure Service Health at 10:48 UTC, the public Azure Status page was updated at 11:30 UTC, and all subscriptions in Australia East were sent portal communications at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • shut down the remaining networking, compute and storage in the two affected data halls so the chilled water loop could cool down
    • restarted the five chillers manually at 12:12 UTC
    • restored power to all hardware by 15:10 UTC and brought infrastructure back in phases
    • restored AKS operations through the recovery of the SQL Database operation queue, with no other mitigation
    Action items
    • AKS: convert all operation queue SQL Database databases to be zone redundant (estimated September 2023)
    • AKS: replace all cross-region SQL Database queue usage with zone-redundant Service Bus queues (estimated September 2023)
    • Change the control timing logic of the Chiller Management System so chillers do not fail to restart after voltage fluctuations
    • Change the emergency procedure for manual restarts of simultaneous chiller failures from an adjacent sequence to a load-based sequence per data hall
    • Increase technician staffing at the datacenter as a temporary measure for manual chiller restarts
    • Storage: optimise the large-scale recovery process and update troubleshooting guides (estimated December 2023)
    • Azure Service Fabric: improve reliability of SQL Database tenant ring recovery (estimated December 2023)
    • SQL Database: review the trigger criteria of auto-failover groups (estimated October 2023)
    • SQL Database: upgrade internal tooling to enable mass migration of databases (estimated December 2023)
    • Cosmos DB: optimise Service Managed Failover for single-region-write accounts (estimated November 2023)
    • ARM: complete the migration of its storage layer to the zonally redundant architecture (estimated December 2023)
    • Incident management: harden readiness, process and playbook for power-down scenarios (estimated October 2023)
    Lessons

    A control plane spread across availability zones still fails with a zone when one of its dependencies, here the SQL Database operation queue, is not zone redundant. When a second region uses the same database, the failure crosses into that region as well. Workloads already running were not expected to be affected; what stopped was everything that needs the managed service's control plane, such as scaling and cluster changes.

Check your cluster for this

These 29 cases involve Kubernetes API server and kubelet. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause11

Dependency failure3 cases

  1. IL-0133 A storm shut down cooling at Nebius's us-central1 data center, and a disk hot-plug bug kept Managed Kubernetes control planes down for hours after power returned
    Nebius2026
  2. IL-0135 A power source switch during UPS maintenance cut power to a row of GPU servers and shut down Crusoe Cloud VMs in us-northcentral1
  3. IL-0073 Intermittent Kafka connectivity overloaded Docker daemons, set off a node rescheduling cascade and poisoned the Consul gossip mesh
    Target2019

Configuration change1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0063 VPN outage after recreating a Redis StatefulSet restarted the whole Redis cluster without readiness checks

Capacity exhaustion12 cases

  1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries
  2. IL-0080 kube-dns on Mercari's GKE clusters could not keep up with peak-hour DNS query rates, and a Sev1 production outage followed when several services failed DNS resolution
  3. IL-0170 During a Lunar New Year event, traffic more than three times normal filled the nf_conntrack table on the EKS node running the Istio ingress gateway, dropping packets and taking down Backpackr's web and app services
  4. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down
  5. IL-0085 A control plane node of Magic Pages' Kubernetes cluster on Hetzner Cloud ran out of memory, the cluster's own calls then used up the Hetzner API rate limit, and all customer websites were down for about 7.5 hours
  6. IL-0169 The Scaleway Kubernetes API in FR-PAR ran out of memory under simultaneous deployments, and because it also handled node authentication, Kapsule and Kosmos nodes went NotReady
  7. IL-0093 Ingress controller pods crash-looped one after another because the leader pod had exhausted its shared memory
  8. IL-0002 CI builder pods could not get AWS IAM credentials because kubelet fell minutes behind its API rate limit
  9. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances
  10. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down
  11. IL-0031 Kubernetes API server OOM-killed, leaving the Skipper ingress without routes; the talk points to a misconfigured CronJob manifest
  12. IL-0040 Parallel Helm installs saturated small gp2 root volumes on a kops cluster and left all three workers NotReady with the kubelet or Docker down

Breaking change in an upgrade2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0101 After Google forced a GKE control plane upgrade to 1.33.2 at a deprecation deadline, no new node could initialise, so autoscaling and spot node replacement stopped for 15 hours
  2. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023

Software defect3 cases

  1. IL-0138 A failed Nvidia driver build left broken kernel packages on the only Kubernetes master node, which hit a kernel panic on reboot after a power outage and took the homelab cluster down for six days
  2. IL-0196 Adding a second Redis replica and lowering memory limits in one RedisFailover change restarted the only Redis pod that held data, and Sentinel promoted the empty new replica, erasing the data
    Palark2020
  3. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017

Hardware failure2 cases

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0127 Llama 3 405B pre-training on 16K H100 GPUs was interrupted 419 times unexpectedly in 54 days, mostly by faulty GPUs, HBM3 memory and other hardware
    Meta2024
  2. IL-0185 A disk failure made the first control plane node of a Kubespray cluster read-only, and recovery needed the Kubespray inventory reordered and a new control plane node joined

Cloud provider outage2 cases

  1. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast
  2. IL-0096 A GKE node pool pinned to the europe-west2-b zone could not scale for 6.5 hours because Google ran out of resources in that zone (ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED)
    2i2c2022

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0113 The managed GKE control plane of Webhook Relay's main cluster failed because its API server certificates had never been rotated, and a manual credential rotation reported success without taking effect

Faulty deployment1 case

Contributing factor
  1. IL-0088 A validating admission webhook added by a new ingress controller module version made the live-1 cluster reject every new Ingress with an x509 error

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0199 A non-essential container exceeding its memory limit made GitHub's production pods unavailable, and their restarts failed because a DNS maintenance change had left the clusters unable to reach the image registry
    GitHub2020

unknown1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe