Cases29 cases

12 to 16 of 29

1. IL-0135 A power source switch during UPS maintenance cut power to a row of GPU servers and shut down Crusoe Cloud VMs in us-northcentral1

   Crusoe Cloud2023

   Symptoms

   At 20:31 UTC on 15 November 2023, some GPU virtual machines in us-northcentral1-a became unavailable. One row of servers in a Crusoe Cloud data center in the us-northcentral1 region had lost power, and every server in the row powered off together with the VMs running on it.

   GPU unavailableService outage

   Trigger

   While the row's UPS was in bypass mode for routine maintenance, power switched from the primary source to a backup source for reasons unrelated to the maintenance.

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   Data center power and cooling

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureOverlapping failures

   Detection

   The power failure happened at 20:31 UTC. The first status post, at 21:07 UTC, said certain VMs in us-northcentral1-a were unavailable, and at 21:31 UTC the status page said the affected VMs had been identified.

   Remediation

   • identified the VMs on the row that lost power
   • restarted the affected VMs after power was restored

   Action items

   • Review the standard operating procedures for UPS maintenance to minimise customer impact during future maintenance
   • Build future data centers with redundant UPSs
   • Improve recovery procedures to reduce mean time to resolution

   Lessons

   When the only UPS for a row is in bypass for maintenance, the row is exposed to any power event during that window, even one unrelated to the work. Crusoe Cloud's response is redundant UPSs in future data centers, a review of maintenance procedures, and faster recovery of VMs after power returns.

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2. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast

   Microsoft Azure2023

   Symptoms

   From about 10:30 UTC on 30 August 2023, customers had trouble accessing or using Azure, Microsoft 365 and Power Platform services in Australia East. The affected Azure services included Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) along with storage, SQL Database, Cosmos DB, virtual machines and Azure Resource Manager.

   Control plane unresponsiveHigh error rateService outage

   Trigger

   At 08:41 UTC a lightning strike on electrical infrastructure about 18 miles away caused a utility voltage sag that shut down the cooling chillers of datacenters in one Australia East availability zone; 13 chillers failed to restart automatically and five could not be restarted, so two data halls overheated and their infrastructure was shut down.

   Root cause

   Cloud provider outage

   Component

   AKS control planeApplication database

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureExcessive blast radius

   Detection

   Cosmos DB impact was detected by monitoring at 10:47 UTC, first automated communications went to Azure Service Health at 10:48 UTC, the public Azure Status page was updated at 11:30 UTC, and all subscriptions in Australia East were sent portal communications at 11:36 UTC.

   Remediation

   • shut down the remaining networking, compute and storage in the two affected data halls so the chilled water loop could cool down
   • restarted the five chillers manually at 12:12 UTC
   • restored power to all hardware by 15:10 UTC and brought infrastructure back in phases
   • restored AKS operations through the recovery of the SQL Database operation queue, with no other mitigation

   Action items

   • AKS: convert all operation queue SQL Database databases to be zone redundant (estimated September 2023)
   • AKS: replace all cross-region SQL Database queue usage with zone-redundant Service Bus queues (estimated September 2023)
   • Change the control timing logic of the Chiller Management System so chillers do not fail to restart after voltage fluctuations
   • Change the emergency procedure for manual restarts of simultaneous chiller failures from an adjacent sequence to a load-based sequence per data hall
   • Increase technician staffing at the datacenter as a temporary measure for manual chiller restarts
   • Storage: optimise the large-scale recovery process and update troubleshooting guides (estimated December 2023)
   • Azure Service Fabric: improve reliability of SQL Database tenant ring recovery (estimated December 2023)
   • SQL Database: review the trigger criteria of auto-failover groups (estimated October 2023)
   • SQL Database: upgrade internal tooling to enable mass migration of databases (estimated December 2023)
   • Cosmos DB: optimise Service Managed Failover for single-region-write accounts (estimated November 2023)
   • ARM: complete the migration of its storage layer to the zonally redundant architecture (estimated December 2023)
   • Incident management: harden readiness, process and playbook for power-down scenarios (estimated October 2023)

   Lessons

   A control plane spread across availability zones still fails with a zone when one of its dependencies, here the SQL Database operation queue, is not zone redundant. When a second region uses the same database, the failure crosses into that region as well. Workloads already running were not expected to be affected; what stopped was everything that needs the managed service's control plane, such as scaling and cluster changes.

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3. IL-0185 A disk failure made the first control plane node of a Kubespray cluster read-only, and recovery needed the Kubespray inventory reordered and a new control plane node joined

   Hans H. Kim2023

   Symptoms

   The kernel on a master node of the Kubernetes cluster logged disk I/O errors: "[HAWKEYE] kernel:: [22329228.540857] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev sda, sector 795030104 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 0". The sda disk switched to read-only, and the machine needed a new disk and an operating system reinstall.

   Node NotReady

   Trigger

   A hardware failure of the disk on the first control plane node.

   Root cause

   Hardware failure

   Component

   KubesprayetcdNode root diskConfigMaps and Secrets

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failure

   Detection

   Disk I/O errors from blk_update_request on dev sda appeared in the node's kernel log.

   Remediation

   • reordered the kube_control_plane group in the Kubespray inventory so that node-2 became the first control plane node
   • removed the failed machine from the cluster
   • edited the cluster-info ConfigMap in kube-public to point at a live control plane node and updated certificate-authority-data
   • installed and configured kubelet and the other components on a new node and joined it as a control plane node with kubeadm, skipping the etcd join phase
   • added the etcd member separately

   Lessons

   In a Kubespray cluster the first node of the kube_control_plane inventory group is special, so its failure needs its own procedure: move another node into the first position, fix the cluster-info ConfigMap, join a new control plane node and add the etcd member back. etcd should be brought back to full membership before another control plane node fails.

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4. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes

   Reddit2023

   Symptoms

   About two minutes after an engineer started the Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24 upgrade of the cluster running Reddit's legacy stack, just after 19:00 UTC, the site stopped. The CDN edge request graph, which is kept separate from the cluster, showed traffic by status collapsing. Users saw the error page, a homepage with no posts, or plain errors.

   Service outageHigh error rateDNS resolution failuresMonitoring outagePods stuck in ContainerCreatingControl plane lag

   Trigger

   An in-place upgrade of the legacy cluster from Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24; in 1.24 the node-role.kubernetes.io/master label is removed even from running clusters.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   CalicoKubernetes API serverAdmission webhooketcd

   Contributing factor

   Configuration not in codeUnrepresentative stagingUntested backupMonitoring blind spotSingle point of failure

   Detection

   The site broke about two minutes into the upgrade; an incident was opened immediately and responders were on the call within three minutes, working from CDN edge graphs because the cluster's own metrics were gone.

   Remediation

   • deleted the Open Policy Agent webhook configurations to stop API server timeouts
   • terminated all worker nodes of the cluster
   • restored the control plane from the pre-upgrade backup onto the first control plane node
   • switched off the cluster autoscaler until the control plane was stable
   • generated new TLS certificates so replacement control plane nodes could join etcd
   • brought traffic back in steps from 1% to 100%
   • restarted legacy services that had been stopped by hand

   Action items

   • Codify cluster configuration so every choice has a record, and document in detail what cannot be codified
   • Standardise components across clusters and replace bespoke configurations
   • Build tooling to manage the lifecycle of whole clusters so they can be recreated or replicated
   • Add pre-production clusters that can be tested with confidence
   • Improve the backup restore process and make cluster upgrades safe

   Lessons

   Configuration that exists only in a live cluster, edited by hand through a special tool, can be forgotten, as the route reflector setup was, and then break on an upgrade nobody connects it to. A Kubernetes upgrade cannot be reverted without a restore, so the restore procedure has to be kept current and practised. Consistent, codified clusters are what make upgrades testable; bespoke clusters keep producing outages.

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5. IL-0096 A GKE node pool pinned to the europe-west2-b zone could not scale for 6.5 hours because Google ran out of resources in that zone (ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED)

   2i2c2022

   Symptoms

   A user of the LIS JupyterHub reported a "backoff after failed scale-up" error, and user servers would not start. An engineer opened incident #36, "LIS hub cannot scale", at 5:40 AM Pacific on 14 November 2022.

   Scale-up failurePods PendingService outage

   Trigger

   At 10 AM UK time on 14 November 2022, the B zone of Google Cloud's europe-west2 region (London) ran out of resources to allocate. The LIS cluster's nodes were restricted to that zone.

   Root cause

   Cloud provider outage

   Component

   Node poolCluster autoscaler

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failurePages not delivered

   Detection

   A user reported the "backoff after failed scale-up" error; an engineer opened the incident at 5:40 AM Pacific, about three hours and forty minutes after the zone ran out of resources.

   Remediation

   • edited the node pool in the GCP console to allow node creation in the A and C zones of europe-west2, which were not exhausted

   Action items

   • Either restrict the node pool back to the B zone after the Black Friday event, or move the cluster and the NFS Filestore to the A zone (infrastructure issue #1944)
   • Investigate an enterprise plan that allows a regional NFS, at higher cost (infrastructure issue #1945)
   • Make sure PagerDuty notifications always get through to engineers (team-compass issue #574)

   Lessons

   A node pool pinned to one zone for storage performance cannot scale when the cloud provider runs out of capacity in that zone. The autoscaler's "backoff after failed scale-up" message usually points to quotas, and raising quotas does nothing here; the ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED error in the logs is what identifies a zone without capacity. The review found that one engineer wearing many hats (incident commander, comms and debugging), with pages not reaching the other responders, made the response harder; a team response would have given more support.

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