Cases14 cases

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1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries

   PostHog2025

   Symptoms

   On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

   Sustained high node CPUHigh error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopDatabase overload

   Trigger

   On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node poolPod scheduling and placementIn-memory cacheApplication database

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitRetry stormIneffective rollbackSingle point of failureNo staged rolloutUnrepresentative staging

   Detection

   On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

   Remediation

   • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
   • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
   • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
   • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
   • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
   • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
   • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
   • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call

   Action items

   • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
   • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
   • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
   • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
   • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
   • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
   • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
   • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
   • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
   • Build a production-scale load testing framework
   • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
   • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms

   Lessons

   Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

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2. IL-0078 Enabling EKS secrets encryption with KMS through Terraform removed worker node IAM permissions and took down all ZenML Pro workspaces

   ZenML2025

   Symptoms

   Between 12 AM and 8 AM CEST on 11 May 2025, every ZenML Pro workspace server was unreachable, so customers could not use workspace UIs or pipelines. The ZenML Pro dashboard was not affected.

   Service outage

   Trigger

   At 23:38 on 10 May, secrets encryption with AWS KMS was enabled through Terraform as part of the EKS module upgrade.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   TerraformNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Unrepresentative stagingDeferred upgrades

   Detection

   Engineers found the cluster degraded when they resumed the upgrade at 06:00.

   Remediation

   • deleted and recreated the EKS node group with the correct IAM permissions and configuration
   • restored service access across all affected ZenML Pro environments

   Action items

   • Upgrade all Terraform modules (EKS, VPC) to current supported versions
   • Complete the EKS cluster upgrades as planned
   • Review the strategy for periodic Kubernetes and infrastructure upgrades to prevent a recurrence

   Lessons

   A successful upgrade on a much smaller staging cluster understated the risk of the same change in production. Skipping Kubernetes and module versions let upgrade complexity build up until one upgrade carried many changes at once.

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3. IL-0005 A new telemetry service overloaded the Kubernetes API servers of large clusters and broke DNS-based service discovery for all OpenAI services

   OpenAI2024

   Symptoms

   Alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST on 11 December 2024, and from 3:16 PM every OpenAI service was significantly degraded or completely unavailable, including ChatGPT, the API and Sora. The status page reported API calls returning errors and difficulties logging in to platform.openai.com and ChatGPT. Customer impact peaked at 3:40 PM.

   Service outageHigh error rateControl plane unresponsiveDNS resolution failures

   Trigger

   At 2:23 PM PST a change introducing a new telemetry service, which collects detailed Kubernetes control plane metrics, was merged and the deployment pipeline started. Between 2:51 PM and 3:20 PM the change was applied to all clusters.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Kubernetes API serverClient-side DNS resolver and cacheTelemetry agent

   Contributing factor

   Unrepresentative stagingNo staged rolloutCache-masked failureMonitoring blind spotLimited debug access

   Detection

   OpenAI's detection tools worked: alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST, a few minutes before customer impact began at 3:16 PM, and the root cause was identified at 3:16 PM.

   Remediation

   • Scaled clusters down to reduce the total Kubernetes API load
   • Blocked network access to the Kubernetes admin APIs so no new expensive requests arrived
   • Scaled up the Kubernetes API servers
   • Removed the telemetry service once enough control was back
   • Moved traffic from impacted clusters to healthy ones
   • Intervened manually in clusters where simultaneous resource downloads saturated resource limits

   Action items

   • Put every infrastructure configuration change through a phased rollout with continuous monitoring of both the service workloads and the clusters, including the Kubernetes control plane
   • Run fault injection tests in which the data plane runs without the control plane for longer, and tests that roll out bad changes on purpose to check detection and rollback
   • Build break-glass mechanisms so engineers can reach the Kubernetes API servers in any circumstances
   • Decouple the Kubernetes data plane from the control plane so that service discovery for critical workloads does not depend on the control plane
   • Speed up recovery with better caching and dynamic rate limiters for resources needed at cluster startup, and regular drills that rapidly replace an entire cluster

   Lessons

   Several systems and processes failed at once and interacted in unexpected ways: tests did not catch the change's effect on the Kubernetes control plane, DNS caching put a delay between the change and the failures, and being locked out of the control plane made remediation very slow. Because service discovery used Kubernetes DNS, the control plane was carrying load for product traffic even though the data plane was meant to be independent of it.

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4. IL-0203 A routine Kubernetes cluster system update made the AWS Load Balancer Controller fail, so new pods were never registered with the ALB and Honeycomb's EU1 ingest and UI went down once the last old pods were replaced

   Honeycomb2024

   Symptoms

   Event ingestion and the Honeycomb UI in EU1 became unavailable at 22:00:10 UTC on April 9, 2024, and the status page reported that the EU1 instance was down. Both the ingestion service and the service behind the web UI stopped at roughly the same moment.

   Service outageStale endpoint routing

   Trigger

   A routine system update to the Kubernetes cluster, rolled out earlier on April 9, followed by a regular deployment that replaced pods one at a time.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   Ingress controllerCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Monitoring blind spotUnrepresentative stagingChange with a delayed effect

   Detection

   The first status post, saying the EU1 instance was down, went up at 15:08 PDT (22:08 UTC), about 8 minutes after the outage began. There was no alerting on the AWS Load Balancer Controller.

   Remediation

   • Restarted the AWS Load Balancer Controller
   • Rolled back the Kubernetes cluster system update

   Action items

   • Find the exact cause of the failure so the system update can be deployed safely
   • Add monitoring and alerting on the AWS Load Balancer Controller so on-call engineers learn of a failure quickly and can pause deployments

   Lessons

   A rolling deployment can look healthy while the component that wires new pods into the load balancer is broken; the failure only shows when the last old pod goes away. Honeycomb now treats the AWS Load Balancer Controller as a critical component that needs its own alerting, so deployments can be paused before they remove the last pods that still receive traffic. Extensive testing in development and staging did not reveal the bad interaction.

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5. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes

   Reddit2023

   Symptoms

   About two minutes after an engineer started the Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24 upgrade of the cluster running Reddit's legacy stack, just after 19:00 UTC, the site stopped. The CDN edge request graph, which is kept separate from the cluster, showed traffic by status collapsing. Users saw the error page, a homepage with no posts, or plain errors.

   Service outageHigh error rateDNS resolution failuresMonitoring outagePods stuck in ContainerCreatingControl plane lag

   Trigger

   An in-place upgrade of the legacy cluster from Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24; in 1.24 the node-role.kubernetes.io/master label is removed even from running clusters.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   CalicoKubernetes API serverAdmission webhooketcd

   Contributing factor

   Configuration not in codeUnrepresentative stagingUntested backupMonitoring blind spotSingle point of failure

   Detection

   The site broke about two minutes into the upgrade; an incident was opened immediately and responders were on the call within three minutes, working from CDN edge graphs because the cluster's own metrics were gone.

   Remediation

   • deleted the Open Policy Agent webhook configurations to stop API server timeouts
   • terminated all worker nodes of the cluster
   • restored the control plane from the pre-upgrade backup onto the first control plane node
   • switched off the cluster autoscaler until the control plane was stable
   • generated new TLS certificates so replacement control plane nodes could join etcd
   • brought traffic back in steps from 1% to 100%
   • restarted legacy services that had been stopped by hand

   Action items

   • Codify cluster configuration so every choice has a record, and document in detail what cannot be codified
   • Standardise components across clusters and replace bespoke configurations
   • Build tooling to manage the lifecycle of whole clusters so they can be recreated or replicated
   • Add pre-production clusters that can be tested with confidence
   • Improve the backup restore process and make cluster upgrades safe

   Lessons

   Configuration that exists only in a live cluster, edited by hand through a special tool, can be forgotten, as the route reflector setup was, and then break on an upgrade nobody connects it to. A Kubernetes upgrade cannot be reverted without a restore, so the restore procedure has to be kept current and practised. Consistent, codified clusters are what make upgrades testable; bespoke clusters keep producing outages.

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