Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases21 cases

1 to 5 of 21

  1. Symptoms

    On 25 March 2026 from about 16:40, public sector organisations on the PSBA network across Wales lost connectivity at their sites. The Service Desk saw about 400 alerts at 16:58, when a Major Incident was declared, about 1,500 at 17:05 and about 5,000 across Wales at 17:08, while councils, a fire and rescue service and Natural Resources Wales phoned in to report sites down.

    Trigger

    At 16:30 a route map change was applied, outside formal change control, on a PSBA core Provider Edge (PE) router to leak MPLS VPN routes, so that legacy Capita-operated UPS devices in a /16 subnet could be managed by BT/PSBA. The change was removed at 16:40.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 16:57 Mid Wales Fire & Rescue Service phoned in a loss of connectivity at its Presteigne site, and at 16:58 a case was opened in Service Now for a group of about 400 alerts and a Major Incident was declared.

    Remediation
    • Removed the route map change from the PE router at 16:40
    • Changed QoS on the BGP to bring back the management links, after which alarms cleared
    • Cleared routes and reset inbound BGP advertisements, which did not stop the default route being advertised
    • Corrected the configuration issue affecting the internet learned route at 01:02
    • Performed a controlled reload of the affected router at 01:10, which restored customer services and management connectivity
    Action items
    • Reinforce change control requirements with an internal briefing on formal change submission, the risks of unplanned changes and roles during planned and emergency changes
    • Create a dedicated Microsoft Teams channel as the single real-time communication point for all live P1 and Major Incidents
    • Explore disaster recovery and business continuity test exercises for major or P1 incidents
    • During loss of management access, have all technical teams assess customer impact from what reporting organisations provide, captured and shared in real time by the Service Desk and Incident Management
    • Investigate a fixed link between Capital Quarter and the PSBA management racks in Vantage Data Centre at Newport, with dedicated management terminals and two-factor authentication for access outside the secure management platform
    • Improve initial triage with stronger probing questions when incidents are reported and keep reassessing and communicating impact throughout the incident
    • Review the P1 and Major Incident process so escalation criteria and timeframes are clearly defined, and train the Service Desk to recognise and escalate them early
    • Review the PSBA estate for legacy configuration, set processes and timeframes for removing it and add controls so it is not introduced again
    • Review email and SMS distribution lists and processes and reinforce Service Desk training on customer communications during P1 and Major Incidents
    Lessons

    The report names eight lessons: a change was made outside PSBA change control; internal communication during the Major Incident was slow and fragmented; the organisation was not ready for a network-wide incident; losing management access stopped the resolver groups from seeing the network state and customer impact; the resolver groups did not understand customer impact in enough detail, which delayed finding the root cause; escalation to PSBA management was slow; legacy configuration left in the network contributed; and email and SMS communications did not reach some customers in time.

  2. Symptoms

    On 3 March 2026, during a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch in a cluster in IONOS Cloud's TXL data center, monitoring alerts fired and the hosts in that cluster lost network connectivity. Customers saw intermittent network degradation or outages, and the Data Center Designer (DCD) web frontend and the AI Model Hub became unreachable.

    Trigger

    During a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 of 2 in the affected cluster was disabled as planned, and a link flap on a switch in Topology 1 then flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    IONOS began investigating monitoring alerts in TXL; the first status update was posted at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Switched from the affected control plane to its standby
    • Rebooted the locked-up gateways
    • Recovered Topology 1 from the scheduled maintenance
    • Paused provisioning in the cluster that had a backlog of queued jobs
    • Re-enabled provisioning once network connectivity improved and watched job execution
    • Re-established connectivity for the systems that support the DCD
    Action items
    • Adjusted the control-plane configuration to use less aggressive failover timers and reduced heavy sweep activity, lowering the load on the forwarding table
    • Reduced the number of multicast group memberships to relieve the forwarding table
    • Set up continuous monitoring of forwarding table use and control-plane memory with alerts before capacity limits are reached
    • Move the control plane to dedicated high-performance servers, separate from data-plane traffic
    • Audit IPv6 configurations and IPoIB driver settings
    • Modernise the interconnect fabric, including switches, gateways and drivers
    • Hardened IAM maintenance protocols so that critical identity services keep working when the primary Cloud APIs are temporarily unavailable
    • Move IAM to a dedicated platform without a dependency on the standard managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Introduce a dedicated provisioning provider for DBaaS and Managed Kubernetes
    • Add automated circuit breakers to the provisioning engine against overload and queue buildup from self-healing services
    • Improve visibility and control over job execution and prioritisation in the provisioning queue
    • Change the provisioning queue architecture to decouple services and reduce spillover
    Lessons

    IONOS identified the linking of services through the shared provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted as long as it did. Alongside making each service more robust, it is decoupling the provisioning queue and addressing dependencies between services to reduce the blast radius of future incidents.

  3. Symptoms

    On 22 January 2026 from 20:25 UTC, a Cloudflare edge router in Miami sent unintended BGP advertisements of IPv6 prefixes to its transit providers and peers. External networks' traffic was funnelled into the Miami data center, the backbone between Miami and Atlanta became congested, and some Cloudflare customer traffic saw elevated loss and higher latency.

    Trigger

    At 20:25 UTC Cloudflare's policy automation pushed a change, merged at 19:52 UTC, that removed the BGP announcements from Miami for a data center in Bogotá, Colombia, by deleting the prefix-list 6-BOG04-SITE-LOCAL from several export policy terms.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The network team began investigating unintended route advertisements from Miami at 20:40 UTC, and an incident was raised at 20:44 UTC.

    Remediation
    • A network operator reverted the bad configuration change on the Miami router by hand
    • Paused the automation for the router so it could not run again
    • Reverted the triggering change in the network automation code repository
    • Unpaused the automation on the Miami router after confirming it ran without the routing policy bug
    Action items
    • Patch the failure in the routing policy automation that caused the leak
    • Add BGP community-based safeguards that reject routes received from providers and peers on external export policies
    • Add automatic routing policy evaluation to the CI/CD pipelines that looks for empty or erroneous policy terms
    • Detect problems in network configurations and the effects of automated changes earlier
    • Validate routing equipment vendors' implementations of RFC9234 before rolling out BGP roles and the Only-to-Customer Attribute
    • Encourage long-term adoption of RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
    Lessons

    Removing only the prefix lists from export policy terms left terms that were too permissive, because a match on route-type internal accepts IBGP routes as well. Cloudflare states that route leaks are easy to cause by accident and that RFC9234 is the only way, independent of routing policy, to prevent route leaks caused at the local AS.

  4. Symptoms

    Customers using Linode's US-MIA (Miami) and IT-MIL (Milan) data centers saw packet loss and brief performance problems on 14 September 2025 from 17:42 to 18:43 UTC. BR-GRU (Sao Paulo) had the same packet loss on 15 September 2025 from 01:44 to 04:22 UTC.

    Trigger

    A gradual increase in prefixes pushed the routing between the core router and the edge router past the maximum number of permitted prefixes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Remediation
    • Raised the prefix limit on all the data center routers
    Action items
    • Raise the thresholds of the sessions between Akamai's backbone and the data center ECOR routers
    • Improve the existing alerting and check its severity before limits are reached, with escalation to the right team for immediate action
  5. Symptoms

    From 16:27 UTC on 21 August 2025, users connecting to Cloudflare from servers in AWS us-east-1, or receiving connections from Cloudflare there, saw high latency, packet loss and failures to reach origins. Cloudflare's network team was alerted to internal congestion in Ashburn (IAD) at 16:44 UTC.

    Trigger

    At about 16:27 UTC a single customer began sending many requests from AWS us-east-1 to Cloudflare for objects in Cloudflare's cache, doubling the total traffic from Cloudflare to AWS.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Cloudflare's network team was alerted to internal congestion in Ashburn (IAD) at 16:44 UTC, and an incident was raised for customer impact at 17:45 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Rate limited the single customer whose traffic caused the surge
    • Took further traffic engineering actions that fully resolved the congestion
    • Asked AWS to revert its BGP prefix withdrawals, which AWS finished at 20:07 UTC
    Action items
    • Build a mechanism to deprioritise a customer's traffic when it congests the network enough to affect others
    • Speed up the Data Center Interconnect upgrades to add network capacity
    • Work with AWS so the two companies' BGP traffic engineering actions do not conflict
    • Build a traffic management system that gives each customer a network resource budget and automates the manual actions used here
    Lessons

    Cloudflare concludes that it must isolate customers better so that no single customer can take over shared network resources and degrade the platform for others, and that its network needs enough capacity to meet demand. It describes the outage as the result of insufficient network congestion management during an unusual high-traffic event.

Check your cluster for this

These 21 cases involve BGP routing and Backbone network (WAN). kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Configuration change6 cases

  1. IL-0400 Public sector sites across Wales lost connectivity for over 8 hours as a PE router wrongly advertised a default route
    PSBA2026
  2. IL-0394 A Cloudflare router in Miami leaked IPv6 BGP routes to peers and providers for 25 minutes, congesting the backbone
  3. IL-0225 An IGP purge command made every Microsoft WAN router recompute routes, causing global latency, timeouts and packet loss
  4. IL-0266 Eqiad routers looped traffic between each other after a BGP MED change and could not reach other sites' public IPs
  5. IL-0539 KT's internet service failed nationwide for about 89 minutes as wrong routes spread from one router in Busan
    KT2021
  6. IL-0228 IPv4 routing across OVHcloud's global network broke after a router change put the full internet routing table into OSPF

Capacity exhaustion3 cases

  1. IL-0350 Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast table
  2. IL-0564 Linode's Miami, Milan and Sao Paulo data centers had packet loss as traffic moved onto congested alternate paths
    Linode2025
  3. IL-0341 Traffic between Cloudflare and AWS us-east-1 had high latency, packet loss and origin failures for almost four hours

Faulty deployment1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0563 Linode servers lost connectivity in all data centers as route servers built incomplete BGP route tables
    Linode2025

Software defect5 cases

  1. IL-0233 A VPC control plane release broke IP alias routes in Nebius eu-west1, and Managed Kubernetes pods lost connectivity
    Nebius2025
  2. IL-0347 About 25% of Scaleway FR-PAR-1 hypervisors lost VPC connectivity when both VPC BGP route reflectors got stuck
  3. IL-0342 DigitalOcean's AMS3, LON1 and SFO2 data centers lost Internet connectivity in repeated waves as edge routers failed
  4. IL-0359 Queries to Gandi LiveDNS timed out when two crashed anycast DNS nodes kept announcing all three name server addresses
    Gandi2020
  5. IL-0222 Google Cloud US regions had heavy packet loss and some went unreachable after the network control plane was descheduled

Dependency failure5 cases

  1. IL-0509 SourceHut was down for 170 hours after a DDoS led its upstream network to null-route the PHL datacenter's subnet
  2. IL-0267 Wikimedia's eqsin cache site went unreachable when both of its transport links to the core data centers were down
  3. IL-0255 Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat
  4. IL-0358 Packet Public Cloud locations had high latency and unreachable paths from routing loops and blackholed traffic
    Packet2019
  5. IL-0258 FastMail was unreachable for almost two hours when the GRE tunnels carrying its traffic from Level 3 went down

Operator error1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0221 A backbone maintenance command disconnected all Facebook data centers, and its DNS servers withdrew their BGP routes
    Meta2021